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ABSTRAcT: Since the 199os, DNA profiles have proved to be
a useful law enforcement tool. The government currently
stores and retains DNA samples in state-maintained
databases that are linked together in a centralized National
DNA Index System. Legislation varies widely from state to
state concerning what classes of offenders are incorporated
into such databases, and many states-recognizing the
importance of expanding DNA databases-are increasing the
number of individuals eligible for database inclusion. This
trend of broadening inclusion has prompted a wide range of
privacy concerns and presents potentially problematic
ethical and social consequences.
This note examines a spectrum of academic and
governmental commentaries focusing on the ethical, legal,
and social implications of forensic DNA profiling. The article
explains the technical nature of these databases as an
investigative tool and weighs the pros and cons related to
their use. The article then further examines current and
future policy goals of DNA database programs, including:
whether it is appropriate to retain samples; what types of
samples are most pertinent for retention; and what is the
appropriate scope of inclusion for individuals in a national
system. After examining statutory frameworks already in
place at the state level, the note concludes by evaluating the
projected role of the courts in settling Fourth Amendment
challenges arising from continued DNA database expansion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
DNA analysis has achieved much acclaim over a relatively short
period of time, demonstrating itself as an extraordinary investigative
and crime-solving tool that allows for definitive genetic identification.1
Since the mid-199os, DNA databases have exponentially expanded in
terms of the number of samples they contain, and consequently, their
importance to forensics has increased. While the promise of increased
efficacy has some members of law enforcement and legal academia
advocating for the expansion of criminal DNA databases to include
DNA samples from the entire population,2 civil libertarians advocate
that the benefits of preventing and solving crime do not outweigh the
cost of eroding liberty.3 This paper explores privacy concerns that
cover a wide range of the political spectrum as the judiciary,
legislators, and the American public struggle to make federal and state
DNA laws compatible with the rapid advances of DNA technology.4
The note begins with Part I providing background on the
biological nature of DNA and its use as an identification technology.
The first section additionally outlines the history of DNA database
creation in the United States and identifies problematic
inconsistencies in state statutes regulating the inclusion of samples.
Part I concludes by acknowledging the ongoing public debate
considering the inevitable trade-off between law enforcement and civil
liberty interests surrounding forensic DNA analysis.
Part II identifies discrete legal and policy questions arising from
sample retention. This section examines these questions in light of
voiced privacy concerns, system feasibility, and future directions.
Notably, this section specifically considers the potential flaws of
1 See HENRY C. LEE & FRANKTIRNADY, BLOOD EVIDENCE: How DNA IS REVOLUTIONIZING
THE WAY WE SOLVE CRIMES viii (Perseus Publishing 2003) (explaining that DNA
identification evidence is predicated upon the genetic uniqueness of each individual
(excepting twins, triplets, or clones)).
2 Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, The Expanding Use of DNA in Law
Enforcement: What Role for Privacy?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 153, 154 (2006); see Akhil
Reed Amar, A Search for Justice in Our Genes, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at A31, available
at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9Eo5E7DB173oF934A35756CoA9649C8
B63.
3 Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 2, at 162.
4 See Amar, supra note 2.
IVol. 4:3
BENNEIT
utilizing "junk DNA" as a genetic sample and chronicles U.S.
proposals for a universal database with a population-wide repository.
Part III surveys the application of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence to recent challenges alleging that DNA sample
collection constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure. After
articulating the predominant legal theories, the section acknowledges
that there is an emerging judicial proclivity to permit a wider cross-
section of citizens to provide DNA samples for crime-solving efforts.
Part IV concludes this review.
A. DNA TECHNOLOGY AS AN INVESTIGATIVE TOOL
Each person has a unique set of deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA")
sequencing5 (contained in body cells) that dictates an individual's
physical characteristics and identity and stores hereditary information
that passes from one generation to the next.6 The chemical identifiers
in DNA are akin to the unique ridges on human fingerprints: "DNA
databases provide a function similar to fingerprint indices, in that
they allow investigators to compare genetic profiles recovered from
crime scenes with those taken from convicted individuals."7 However,
DNA is far more information-rich than fingerprints because it
contains the code of a person's hereditary propensities and
susceptibilities, parentage, and racial origins.8 Additionally, DNA is a
5 The fundamental structure of DNA was first identified by James Watson and Francis
Crick (with the help of exquisite X-ray photographs of crystallized DNA by Rosalind
Franklin) in 1953. The structure they identified is that of a double helix resembling a
coiled rope ladder, the supporting sides of which consist of deoxyribose sugar and
phosphate. Between the sugar-phosphate supports are four alternating organic bases:
adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C), and thymine (T). A chemically bonds with T, and C
chemically bonds with G. LEE & TIRNADY, supra note 1, at 3.
6 LAURI R. HARDING, Introduction, in AT ISSUE: DNA DATABASES 7 (Lauri H. Harding ed.,
Greenhaven Press 2007). DNA is the blueprint of life. The entire DNA molecule is coiled
tightly in little bundles that make up the chromosomes. Every normal human being has 46
chromosomes, 1 pair of sex chromosomes (two X chromosomes for females; an X and a Y
for males), and 22 pairs of autosomes (any chromosome that is not a sex chromosome). All
humans receive 22 autosomes plus one X chromosome from their mothers and 22
autosomes and one X or Y chromosome from their fathers. LEE & TIRNADY, supra note 1,
at 3.
7 Jonathan Kimmelman, The Promise and Perils of Criminal DNA Databanking, 18
NATURE BIOTECH. 695, 695 (2000).
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more dependable informant, 9 and genetic information, unlike
fingerprints, is shared among biological relatives.1o Collectively, these
differences between genetic information and traditional fingerprinting
are beneficial identifiers, but these differences also raise concerns with
respect to criminal DNA databases' expanding scope and varying
storage policies.11
The most widely used technology for DNA identification 12 is
generating a "genetic fingerprint" through the polymerase chain
reaction technique ("PCR"). 13 This technique facilitates DNA
identification from a tiny biological sample by amplifying small
amounts of DNA through polymerase chain reactions.4 The process
makes DNA typing possible by producing large amounts of identical
DNA, and the PCR allows investigators to obtain a DNA profile from
postage stamps, coffee cups, and even single hairs.15 Within the DNA
copy produced by PCR, short tandem repeat ("STR") technology16 is
9 The ability to identify a person by his or her DNA carries a certainty greater than 99.9%
(depending on quality of sample and type of test done), and stored DNA samples do not
degrade or degenerate over time like most hair, skin, or tissue samples. HARDING, supra
note 6, at 7.
lo Kimmelman, supra note 7, at 695. Genetic fingerprinting has also been instrumental in
determining paternity and inheritance rights and for identifying remains in mass casualty
situations. HARDING, supra note 6, at 7.
11 Kimmelman, supra note 7, at 695.
12 In January 1999, the FBI mandated that state laboratories switch from the RFLP system
to the new STR system. LEE & TIRNADY, supra note 1, at 172.
13 Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee's DNA a Valid Special Needs Search Under the
Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, 34 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 165, 166 (2006).
14 Garrett E. Land, Judicial Assessment or Judicial Notice? An Evaluation of the
Admissibility Standards for DNA Evidence and Proposed Solutions to Repress the
Current Efforts to Expand Forensic DNA Capabilities, 9 J. MED. & L. 95, 1o6 (2005) ("PCR
testing has been praised for its ability to obtain results with very small sample amounts.").
15 See LEE & TIRNADY, supra note 1, at ix. For a general explanation of DNA typing, see
Land, supra note 14, at 105-107.
16 Short tandem repeats are short stretches of highly repetitive DNA, typically 2-7 base
pairs in length, which are present in all humans and which vary widely between
individuals. Phil Reilly, Legal and Public Policy Issues in DNA Forensics, 2 NATURE
REVIEWS GENETICS 313, 314 (2OO1). For a full explanation and extensive history of STR
technology, see John M. Butler, Genetics and Genomics of Core Short Tandem Repeat Loci
Used in Human Identity Testing, 51 J. FORENSIC SCI. 253 (2006).
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used to identify genetic loci. 17 Genetic loci are used to distinguish
DNA profiles by examining the gene sequence on a specific location on
a chromosome and comparing its length with the gene sequence on
the same chromosome from a different person,s Most of the typing
done at or on behalf of the various state crime labs uses a standard
battery of thirteen STR loci.19 Population geneticists calculated that
the probability of a complete match between profiles of two unrelated
persons in a randomly mating population of Caucasian Americans is
1.74 x 10-15, or 1 in 575 trillion.20 The FBI declared in July of 2000
that, with STR markers, it was 99% certain that no other individual in
the country could have contributed the DNA in any given evidence
sample.21
The viability of DNA as an investigative tool was first realized in
the 199os. Since that time, individual states have implemented
measures that provide for circumstances in which DNA samples can
be collected and retained.22 Virginia created the first DNA database in
1989, and currently, all fifty states have criminal DNA databases23 that
are linked together in the National DNA Index System ("NDIS").24
17 Reilly, supra note 16.
18 Id.
19 The position a gene or other DNA fragment occupies on the DNA ladder is called its
"locus." Land, supra note 14, at 105. "The forensic testing community in the United States
uses a standardized set of thirteen core short tandem repeat (STR) loci." Rothstein &
Talbott, supra note 2, at 156; see also JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC TYPING: BIOLOGY AND
TECHNOLOGY BEHIND STR MARKERS 323 (Elsevier Academic Press 2001).
20 Reilly, supra note 16, at 313-14.
21 LEE & TIRNADY, supra note 1, at 169 (citing B. Budowle, R. Chakaborty, G. Carmody &
K.L. Monson, Source Attribution of a Forensic DNA profile, 2 FORENSIC SCI. COMM. 3 (July
20OO), available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/juIy2ooo/source.htm).
22 Rosemary Walsh, The United States and the Development of DNA Data Banks, PRIVACY
INT'L, Feb. 20, 2006,
http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd%5B347%5D=x-347-528471.
23 See Davina Dana Bressler, Note, Criminal DNA Databank Statutes and Medical
Research, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 51, 51 (2002); see, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1O6-9oo, at 8 (2ooo) as
reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323, 2324.
24 David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger, Statutory Frameworks for Regulating
Information Flows: Drawing Lessons for the DNA Data Banks from Other Government
Systems, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 366, 371 (2OO6); Seth Axelrad, Survey of State DNA
Database Statutes 2005, AM. SOC. OF LAw, MED. & ETHICS,
http://www.aslme.org/dna 04/grid/index.php (click on "statutes grid- html format")
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Maintained by the FBI,25 the federal Combined DNA Index System
("CODIS") allows for interstate comparison of DNA profiles.26
Although all fifty states currently have legislation requiring that
DNA profiles of certain categories of individuals be included in at least
two levels of CODIS,27 the legislation varies widely from state to state
concerning which classes of offenders are incorporated into the
national database. 28 Congress attempted to combat problematic
inconsistencies by passing the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act
of 2000.29 This statute authorized the U.S. Attorney General to issue
grants to the states in order to expand the CODIS database to include
analysis of samples taken from individuals convicted of a qualifying
(last visited Feb. 22, 2009). Additionally, all fifty states have statutes providing for
obligatory DNA banking of blood and saliva samples for those convicted of certain felony
crimes. Similar federal legislation is in force covering those convicted of specified offenses
in the District of Columbia and other U.S. federal territories and property and members of
the U.S. military while on active duty. Frank R. Bieber, Science and Technology of
Forensic DNA Profiling: Current Use and Future Directions, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 45 (David Lazer ed., The MIT Press 2004);
see also lo U.S.C. § 1565 (2000) (covering military offenses); 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a) (2000)
(covering collection and use of DNA identification information from certain federal
offenders); 42 U.S.C. § 14135(b) (covering collection and use of DNA identification
information from certain District of Columbia offenders).
25 Statutory authority to create the national database was provided by the federal DNA Act,
contained within the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, and led to the
creation of the National DNA Index System ("NDIS"). In September 2005, a further
initiative to expand the collection practice was added by the Senate Judiciary Committee to
the Violence Against Women Act, and the amendment known as the DNA Fingerprint Act
of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) (2005). Title X of Pub. Law lo9-162 (2006) passed with the
effect of removing barriers to maintaining data from criminal arrestees and making it
easier to include their DNA samples in the NDIS; see Walsh, supra note 22, at 2.
26 Bieber, supra note 24, at 45-46. Rather than a single centralized source, CODIS is a
three-tiered structure of information sharing; all profiles originate from local laboratories.
The states then collect this information for their state-wide databases. At the highest level
of this hierarchy, CODIS, is the NDIS, which permits states participating in the CODIS
program to compare samples at a national level. To aid in criminal investigation, CODIS
has two indices: one containing DNA profiles of individuals, and the other containing
unidentified DNA from crime scenes. Elizabeth E. Joh, Commentary, Reclaiming
"Abandoned" DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, loo Nw. U. L. REv. 857,
876 n.97 (2006).
27 Maclin, supra note 13, at 166.
28 Id.
29 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a)(1).
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offense as determined by that state.30 Recognizing the importance of
expanding DNA databases, many states have increased the number of
individuals eligible for inclusion in the CODIS system. 31 As states
broaden the category of offenders, they will increase their eligibility
for federal funding to reduce their backlogs and solve more crimes.32
1. BENEFITS OF DNA TECHNOLOGY
Policymakers, criminal investigators, and legal professionals have
identified a series of benefits-already derived or potentially
derivable-from the increasingly routine and inexpensive use of DNA
technology and its expanding applications.33 As identified by British
scholars Robin Williams and Paul Johnson, these benefits include the
potential to make speedy and robust suspected offender
identifications through automated profile comparisons in centralized
databases; the ability to confidently eliminate innocent suspects from
investigations; the increased likelihood of generating reliable and
persuasive evidence for use in court; a reduction in the cost of many
investigations; the likely deterrent effect of DNA databasing on
potential criminal offenders; and a possible increase in public
confidence in policing and in the judicial process as a whole.34
2. CONCERNS OVER DNA TECHNOLOGY
Despite the tangible benefits of expanded DNA databases, the
increased application of this technology has prompted a wide range of
concerns and problems. Civil libertarians, especially, denounce the
storage of tissue samples (particularly those taken from individuals
without consent) and the proliferation of genetic information used by
the police.35 Williams and Johnson note that, "[a]s a result, in
30 See id.
31 Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California's Proposition 69: A Dangerous
Precedent for Criminal DNA Databases, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 279, 282 (2005).
32 Maclin, supra note 13, at 166.
33 Robin Williams & Paul Johnson, Inclusiveness, Effectiveness, and Intrusiveness: Issues
in the Developing Uses of DNA Profiling in Support of Criminal Investigations, 33 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 545, 546 (2005).
34 Id.
35 Williams & Johnson, supra note 33, at 546.
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jurisdictions where forensic DNA databases have been introduced, a
range of critical commentaries have emerged which have sought to
counter claims for the effectiveness of DNA-aided investigations with
assertions of potentially problematic ethical and social consequences
of their uses."36 In a reciprocal analysis to the potential benefits,
Williams and Johnson have also identified the potential pitfalls of the
databases: the threat to the bodily integrity of citizens who are subject
to the non-consensual sampling of their genetic material; the
intrusion and denigration of privacy rights caused by the storage and
use of tissue samples; the potential for the future misuse of such
samples held in state and privately owned laboratories; the prospect
of long term bio-surveillance occasioned by the storage of genetic
information in police databases and forensic laboratories; and the
possibility for the deceptive use of DNA forensic evidence in police
investigations and criminal prosecutions.37
B. DNA DATABASES AS A PUBLIC DEBATE
The discourse over the ethical, legal, and social implications of
forensic DNA profiling has engaged the public interest, and full public
engagement is critical to protect a system of justice that strikes an
appropriate balance between public safety and civil liberties. 38
Generally speaking, the debate over DNA databases often polarizes
libertarian groups-such as the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") and criminal defense lawyers (opposing universal sample
collection39 and sample retention4°)-against prosecutors and police
36 Id.
37 Id. (noting that the literature on these matters is extensive); see also DNA ON TRIAL:
GENETIC IDENTIFICATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (P.R. Billings ed., Cold Spring Harbor Lab.
Press 1992); DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 45-46
(David Lazer ed., The MIT Press 2004); GRAEME T. LAURIE, GENETIC PRIVACY: A
CHALLENGE TO MEDICO-LEGAL NORMS (Cambridge University Press 2002).
38 See Alice Noble, DNA Fingerprinting and Civil Liberties, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 149, 152
(2006).
39 Commentators argue against a universal database on the grounds that it would
constitute a "step toward an Orwellian society" that will make "us [into] a 'nation of
suspects' and radically[]alter the relationship between the citizen and [the] government."
DAVID H. KAYE & MICHAEL E. SMITH, DNA Databases for Law Enforcement: The Coverage
Question and the Case for a Population-Wide Database, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 265 (David Lazer ed., The MIT Press 2004)
(quoting Jean E. McEwen, DNA Databanks, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY
AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC AGE 236 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., Yale University
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seeking broader authority to take biological samples from individual
suspects to solve crimes.41 Somewhere in the middle are victims'
rights groups and feminists who support speedy DNA testing of
evidence taken from victims of rape.42
There is inevitably a trade-off between law enforcement and civil
liberties. The costs and benefits of DNA databases, therefore, are
being closely monitored and fiercely debated. Social theorist David
Garland highlights this point by observing that "surveillance
technologies are an essential part of modern societies."43 Garland
further hypothesizes that the concept of DNA identification for an
entire population may someday be as ordinary as Social Security
numbers, but it is the means by which such surveillance is achieved
and the public discourse and awareness that it generates, which
necessitates widespread attention to facilitate regulation without
abuse.44
II. THE LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SAMPLE RETENTION
This section raises three discrete issues to be resolved through
federal legislation, policy initiatives, and consideration by the
Supreme Court concerning the scope of DNA databases. At the core of
the debate is the basic inquiry as to whether individual privacy
protections can tolerate retention-and hypothetical future abuses-in
government laboratories. Additionally, if U.S. policy continues to opt
for sample retention, the question remains as to what type of sample
Press 1997)). "Storing information on otherwise unsuspected individuals," it is said,
"expresses an ethos of suspicion." Jonathan Kimmelman, supra note 7, at 696.
40 Bressler, supra note 23, at 52 (citing Jonathan Kimmelman, Commentary, Risking
Ethical Insolvency: A Survey of Trends in Criminal Law Databanking, 28 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 209, 212-13 (2000)).
41 See Amar, supra note 2.
42 Id. In January of 2008, Maryland expanded its DNA database to collect samples from
people arrested for murder, rape, and assault (instead of only collecting DNA from
convicted criminals). This statute was passed largely as a result of fierce lobbying by rape
victim Laura Neuman. Kelli Arena & Kevin Bohn, Rape Victim Pushes for Expanded DNA
Database, CNN.CoM, May 12, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2oo8/CRIME/o5/12/dna.database/index.html.
43 Job, supra note 26, at 884 (quoting David Garland, Panopticon Days: Surveillance and
Society, 20 CRIM. JUST. MATrERS 3 (1995)).
44 See id.
2008] 829
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
should actually be retained. As continued biological advances
threaten to reveal genetic information about individuals from samples
previously assumed innocuous, current methods to maintain
information in databases raise significant privacy concerns over
potential misuse by the government, insurers, or employers. Finally,
this section explores national and state-specific policy proposals that
continue to increase the class of citizens compelled to provide DNA
samples to centralized DNA databases.
A. SHOULD DNA SAMPLES BE RETAINED?
The current federal and state policies requiring the criminal justice
system to retain tissue samples are a core issue in the privacy debate.
The FBI quality assurance standards for laboratories participating in
CODIS state: "[w]here possible, the laboratory shall retain or return a
portion of the evidence sample or extract."45 As a result, specimens
may be stored indefinitely in the event a profile is challenged or
testing technology improves. Perhaps the most compelling and
immediate reason for the retention of offender DNA samples is to
promote quality assurance.46 In the event that a potential "match" is
identified, DNA laboratories want to be able to conduct a re-analysis
of the sample before releasing any personally identifiable
information. 47 This re-analysis is a routine part of the match
confirmation process for laboratories participating in the CODIS
program.48 Additionally, given the use of automated batch sample-
processing methods, there is a possibility, however slight, of
inaccurate sample labeling; re-analysis of retained samples is
designed to identify any possible sample mix-up. 49 Accordingly,
"saving the samples could be useful for re-testing or for the inclusion
45 Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Johnson v. Quander, 44o F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 05-5156) [hereinafter EPIC
Brief], reprinted in AT ISSUE: DNA DATABASES 8o (Lauri H. Harding ed., Greenhaven Press
2007).
46 M. Dawn Herkenham, Retention of Offender DNA Samples Necessary to Ensure and
Monitor Quality of Forensic DNA Efforts: Appropriate Safeguards Exist to Protect the
DNA Samples from Misuse, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 380, 381 (2006).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 381-82.
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of additional genetic markers, but as long as the samples are stored,
there is a possibility that they could be used by unauthorized third
parties in ways that might lead to disclosure of confidential
information, or for malicious, retributive, or oppressive purposes."50
Although the FBI policy favors retention of samples,51 currently,
there is no national policy on sample retention, but in almost every
state the samples are retained indefinitely.52 About half of the states
have laws explicitly addressing the retention of DNA samples; the
remaining state statutes are either silent or authorize a state agency to
establish rules regarding storage and retention.s3 In most states,
samples are being retained indefinitely, unless (1) the individual has a
conviction overturned or case dismissed or (2) the individual is an
arrestee who is never convicted.54 Wisconsin is the only state that
explicitly requires the destruction of DNA samples after analysis is
completed,55 although no samples have yet been destroyed. Arizona
requires that all samples be retained for thirty-five years and then
destroyed.56 Nebraska, by contrast, is the only state that explicitly
requires that all samples be permanently retained.57
Privacy advocates call for destruction of all samples after analysis
to provide assurance that samples will not be re-analyzed for an
improper purpose by law enforcement. 58 They assert that the
50 Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 2, at 158 (citing Seth Axelrad, Survey of State DNA
Database Statutes 2005, AM. Soc. OF LAW, MED. & ETHICS,
http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/grid/index.php (click on "statutes grid- html format")
(last visited Feb. 22, 2009)).
51 Law enforcement authorities argue that sample retention is necessary for "quality
assurance purposes" such as re-testing in the event of a mix-up. Tania Simoncelli & Helen
Wallace, As DNA Databases Grow, the Potential for Abuse and Error Increases, in AT
ISSUE: DNA DATABASES 26 (Lauri H. Harding ed., Greenhaven Press 2007).
52 Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 2, at 158 (citing Axelrad, supra note 50).
53 See Axelrad, supra note 50.
54 Id.
55 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 165.77 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007) (requiring destruction after analysis
has been completed and the applicable court proceedings have ended).
56 ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-610 (LexisNexis 2005).
57 NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-4105 (2005).
58 Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope
of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127, 164 (2002).
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destruction of DNA from which the digitized profile is constructed
would greatly diminish public fears about government threats to
genetic privacy.59 Furthermore, destruction of DNA samples after
analysis limits the use of those genetic fingerprints to their core
purpose: a one-time verification without inviting re-purposing at a
later stage.60
From a practical standpoint, it would be possible to operate the
system without retaining DNA samples indefinitely, but there would
be strong resistance to the destruction of samples in some law
enforcement circles. 61 The paucity of uniform privacy protections
compounds the problem from a policy perspective. Essentially, more
and more DNA is being collected-with the advances in genetic
research making this data more and more valuable-yet there is no
legislation in place to comprehensively prohibit and sanction the
potential for misuse. Legislators approaching this issue and wishing
to ensure adequate privacy protections face a crossroads: either place
federal statutory restrictions on the storage of all DNA samples or
protect privacy more permanently by destroying the samples
themselves. 62
B. WHAT TYPE OF SAMPLE SHOULD BE RETAINED?
In addition to the issue as to whether samples should be retained,
there is the technical issue of what type of sample should actually be
retained. Since the inception of DNA databanking, law enforcement
proponents have analogized DNA samples to traditional
fingerprints. 63 However, opponents maintain that this analogy is
59 Reilly, supra note 16, at 315.
60 Lazer & Mayer-Schonberger, supra note 24, at 372.
61 Reilly, supra note 16, at 317.
62 Barry Steinhardt, Privacy and Forensic DNA Data Banks, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 190 (David Lazer ed., The MIT Press 2004);
see also Lazer & Mayer-Schonberger, supra note 24, at 372 (arguing in favor of destroying
samples once they have been typed in order to ensure that a change in political regime
cannot result in an immediate change in the regulation of information or the possibility of
improperly sharing such information with a rogue third party).
63 Commentators have commonly drawn an analogy between DNA and fingerprints;
genetic analysis is often described as "DNA fingerprinting." Joh, supra note 26, at 869;
David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L.
REV. 179, 188 (2001).
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flawed, because like DNA a fingerprint identifies a person, but unlike
a fingerprint, DNA stores and reveals massive amounts of personal,
private data about that individual. The advance of science promises to
make stored DNA only more revealing in time. 64 Genetic data
contains information about an individual that can provide insights
into personal family relationships, disease predisposition, physical
attributes, and ancestry.65
Early in the debate over DNA typing, the loci used in law
enforcement DNA testing were popularly characterized as "lacking
any particular biological function"- they were commonly labeled
"junk DNA." 66  Among biologists, however, the term "junk" was
quickly replaced by "non-coding" but, unfortunately, the colloquialism
stuck. The term "junk DNA" is now considered misleading because
much of the so-called "junk" is believed to have a function, and DNA
markers have the potential to be significant even if they are not within
a coding region.67
Thirteen specific loci-better known as STRs-are used to create
the DNA profiles used in law enforcement databases. 68 Recent
suggestions 69 that these standard DNA fingerprints, used by police
around the world, contain a subtle signature that can be linked with
64 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., concurring); see
also Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 58, at 156-57 (distinguishing DNA samples from
fingerprinting).
65 Tania Simoncelli, Dangerous Excursions: The Case Against Expanding Forensic DNA
Databases to Innocent Persons, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 390, 392 (2OO6).
66 Colloquy, Is the "JUNK"DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 NW. U. L. REv. 54,56 (2007).
67 Id. (citing Colin Nickerson, DNA Study Challenges Basic Ideas in Genetics: Genome
'Junk'Appears Essential, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 2007, at Ai).
68 IS the "JUNK"DNA Designation Bunk?, supra note 66, at 56. For definition and
discussion of "loci," see Land, supra note 14 and supra note 19, at 105; see also Rothstein &
Talbott, supra note 2, at 156 (discussing loci as markers).
69 See W. Wayt Gibbs, The Unseen Genome: Gems Among the Junk, ScI. AM., Nov. 2003,
at 46, 49-50. Gibbs quotes the Director of the Institute for Molecular Bioscience at the
University of Queensland as saying: "I think [junk DNA] will come to be a classic story of
orthodoxy derailing objective analysis of the facts... [It] may well go down as one of the
biggest mistakes in the history of molecular biology." See also Justin Gillis, Genetic Code
of Mouse Published: Comparison with Human Genome Indicates "Junk DNA"May be
Vital, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2002, at Al (reporting that "new discoveries were likely to force
scientists to abandon the term 'junk DNA' and send them back to the drawing board").
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genetic predispositions7O and raise serious privacy concerns as to what
type of sample should be stored in the future. At the very least,
Professor Simon Cole suggests that it would be misleading to claim
that the forensic STRs (used in the CODIS databases) have no medical
significance, are devoid of information, or are completely innocuous
from a privacy standpoint.71 Nonetheless, despite discoveries about
the role "junk DNA" may play in a larger biological scheme, CODIS
proponents ardently maintain that information coded in the databases
will be used solely for identification purposes. 72 Even if STR profiles
could reveal private information-both today and in the future-the
CODIS STRs are of "negligible value" to scientists for ascertaining
information about an individual's health. 73 Another well-known
scholar, Professor David H. Kaye, directly challenges the cautions
raised by Professor Cole: "[t]he scenarios for the misuse by the
government, insurers, or employers of the STR-identification profiles
in NDIS and other law enforcement databases border on science
fiction."74
Furthermore, regardless of "junk DNA's" theoretical potential to
reveal genetic information about an individual, the federal legislature
has already taken steps to ensure the integrity of law enforcement
practices when accessing these databases. The Privacy Act Notice on
the NDIS demonstrates a commitment to safeguard DNA samples and
DNA records from unauthorized disclosure and use.75 Specifically, no
70 "A massive international study of the human genome has caused scientists to rethink
some of the most basic concepts of cellular function.... Among critical findings: A huge
amount of DNA long regarded as useless-and dismissively labeled "junk DNA"-now
appears to be essential to the regulatory processes that control cells. Also, the regions of
DNA lying between genes may be powerful triggers for diseases- and may hold the key for
potential cures." Nickerson, supra note 67, at Al.
7 Is the "JUNK"DNA Designation Bunk?, supra note 66, at 59; but see Colloquy, Please,
Let's Bury the Junk: The CODIS Loci and the Revelation of Private Information, 102 Nw.
U. L. REV. 70, 71 (2007) (clarifying why STR profiles are useless as a genetic test to screen
for any particular disease and are useful only for identification purposes).
72 Please, Let's Bury the Junk: The CODIS Loci and the Revelation of Private Information,
supra note 71, at 71, 8o-81.
73 Id. at 8o-81 (conceding that DNA profiles are potentially more revealing than
fingerprints or social security numbers, but the information content is no more threatening
than that of a blood group or tissue type).
74 Id. at 81.
75 Herkenham, supra note 46, at 382.
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personal identifying information (other than the specimen
identification number) is stored on NDIS,76 and the Federal DNA
Identification Act requires very limited disclosure and use of the DNA
samples and records.77 Forty-six states similarly limit access to and
disclosure of DNA samples and records in their databases, and a
majority of state DNA database statutes include specific provisions
governing the confidentiality of the DNA records and/or DNA
samples.78
As a final precautionary measure, the unauthorized acquisition or
disclosure of DNA information is subject to prosecution.79 At the
federal level, the penalty is a fine not to exceed $250,000 or
imprisonment for a period not to exceed one year. 8° Thirty-eight
states also have criminal penalties for the unauthorized use or
disclosure of DNA records, and eighteen states expressly penalize
tampering with or unlawfully obtaining a DNA sample as a felony
offense.8 1
Despite proffered safeguards, questions remain for citizens
concerned about potential privacy risks posed by calling the current
thirteen loci sample (forensic STRs) "junk," or "not socially or
medically significant."82 Legal scholar Mark Rothstein maintains that
if public policy must balance a range of options, then it is incumbent
upon those advocating an expansion of police powers to demonstrate
how substantial public interests in deterrence and justice are
fostered.83 For example, an increasing intrusion of individual rights
should not be tolerated unless the law enforcement benefits are
tangible and readily apparent. Additionally, concurring skeptics
worry about the ad hoc protections afforded by state laws to prevent
76 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §552a (1996); New System of Records, 61 Fed. Reg.
139,37495 (1996).
77 For a full list of the requirements for limited disclosure, see 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3)
(2004).
78 See Herkenham, supra note 46, at 383 (citing individual state statutes).
79 Id.
80 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 14133(c), 14135(e); 42 U.S.C. § 14132(c).
81 See Herkenham, supra note 46, at 383 (citing individual state statutes).
82 Is the "JUNK" DNA Designation Bunk?, supra note 66, at 62.
83 Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 58, at 158.
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abuse: as long as millions of biological samples are held in the absence
of uniform regulations, there will remain a temptation to use them for
purposes that go beyond law enforcement identification.8 4 Given the
strong public concern about the privacy risks associated with DNA
databases, there appear cogent reasons to pass legislation
standardizing the types of samples collected; the analytical method
used to generate a DNA profile; the limitations on sample access; the
appropriate forensic purposes for which the data can be used; and
federal sanctions for unauthorized access to, or use of, database
information.8 5
C. FROM WHOM SHOULD SAMPLES BE RETAINED?
The promise of increased efficacy has some members of law
enforcement and legal academia advocating for the expansion of
criminal DNA databases to include samples from the entire
population. 86 A variety of practical and policy issues shape the debate
over whose DNA should be included in government DNA databases,
but the recent trend is toward a system where the government has
access to an increasing number of DNA samples. Currently, all fifty
states and federal law compel the collection of DNA from at least some
categories of criminal offenders, 87 but states independently continue
to add to the list of individuals forced to provide a DNA sample for
analysis.88
1. FUTURE PROPOSALS FOR A UNIVERSAL DATABASE
As states have realized the success of a centralized DNA database,
they have subsequently realized that its utility is based on the number
84 Steinhardt, supra note 62, at 174.
85 See Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 58, at 161-66.
86 Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 2, at 154 (citing Amar, supra note 2).
87 Paul M. Monteleoni, DNA Databases, Universality, and the Fourth Amendment, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 252 (2007).
88 Ashley J. McCarron, Comment, Do the Crime, Serve the Time, Then Leave Your DNA
Behind: United States v. Weikert, 3 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 379, 387 (2007) (citing
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USING DNA TO SOLVE COLD CASES 9 (2002),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/194197.htm (commenting on states' expansion of
categories of individuals required to submit DNA)).
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of profiles contained within the database.8 9 At first, only convicted
murderers and sex offenders were required to provide a DNA sample
for profiling, but recent success with the database has led to the
inclusion of less violent offenders, even those merely suspected of a
crime.90 Each state remains sovereign in its mandatory requirements
for sample collection, but the resulting discrepancies by jurisdiction
have led some commentators to perceive an urgent need to legislate
strong safeguards implementing a universal, federal database.91 Such
proposals advocate for a federal DNA statute that would limit access
to appropriate government officials and issue severe penalties for
misuse of DNA.92 With protections in place, the government would
then take a biological sample from as many citizens as possible (such
as when adults renew driver's licenses), including every newborn, and
the federal government would subsequently generate a DNA profile
for each person.93 This data would be stored in a database and could
be checked against any genetic material found at crime scenes across
the country.94
The campaign for the national universal database is largely due to
the success of criminal DNA databases. In 1999, the proposal gained
widespread media coverage and increased public discourse when New
York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani proposed collection of DNA
samples from all newborns for both medical and law enforcement
purposes.95 In practical terms, it is not far-fetched to imagine such a
protocol being adopted. Currently, all states have laws that mandate
screening newborns for genetic diseases, as well as laws that ensure
the confidentiality of those test results.96 Furthermore, in 2001, three
89!d.
90 Id.
91 See generally David H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases:
Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIs. L. REV. 413,
421 (2003); Amar, supra note 2.
92 See Amar, supra note 2.
93 For a discussion of a possible path to a population-wide database, see Kaye & Smith,
supra note 91, at 437.
94 Amar, supra note 2.
95 Simoncelli & Steinhardt, supra note 31, at 283.
96 For example, states require testing of newborns for phenylketonuria ("PKU'), a rare
condition that results in profound mental retardation that can only be diagnosed and
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highly influential legal scholars 97 (all serving as members of the
National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence) 98 began
publicly advocating, "a single, population-wide DNA database for the
United States."99 Because "cold hits"1°° from DNA registries are now a
routine matter, they argue that a universal database would eliminate
the specter of a racially skewed national DNA database.ol
Such proposals are not without comparative precedents. Both
Estonia and the United Kingdom have proposed population-based
DNA collections and research projects, and the most internationally
discussed DNA-based project-deCODE in Iceland-is a commercial
project to generate a computerized database collecting medical
records and DNA samples from the entire population for population-
treated by blood testing before any symptoms appear. Teresa K. Baumann, Note, Proxy
Consent and a National DNA Databank: An Unethical and Discriminatory Combination,
86 IowA L. REv. 667, 677 (2001) (citing Paul A. Lombardo, Genetic Confidentiality: What's
the Big Secret?, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 589, 598 (1996)).
97 Michael E. Smith is a professor of law at the University of Wisconsin; David H. Kaye is a
professor of law at Arizona State University; Edward J. Imwinkelried is a professor of law
at the University of California-Davis. LEE & TIRNADY, supra note 1, at 175.
98 In 1997, Attorney General Janet Reno, as a result of her interest in the value of DNA
evidence to exonerate wrongfully convicted persons, created the National Commission on
the Future of DNA Evidence to advise the United States Department of Justice on
unresolved policy questions. Reilly, supra note 16, at 315.
99 LEE & TIRNADY, supra note 1, at 175.
100 "Cold hits" within the national DNA database links someone in the database (often a
convicted offender) to an unsolved or "cold case." See Liza Porteus, Supporters, Critics
Debate DNA Database Expansion, FOX NEWS.COM, May 9, 2003,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/o,2933,86390,oo.html. "While a suspect may not leave
any other physical evidence behind, investigators can use DNA to place the suspect at the
scene of a crime, especially where there are no eyewitnesses. DNA is helpful in solving
crimes because it can link one crime scene to another, a suspect to a victim, a victim to a
suspect, and a victim to a crime scene." Laura A. Matejik, DNA Sampling: Privacy and
Police Investigation in a Suspect Society, 61 ARK. L. REV. 53, 58 (2008); but cf. Rothstein
& Talbott, supra note 2, at 154 (equating "cold hits" to mean something equivalent to
"investigations aided," but concluding that there is no clear definition of the term).
1o, According to Smith, Kaye, and Imwinkelried: "The Bureau of Justice Statistics report
that a black man is six times more likely to be imprisoned during his life than a white
man," and given this data, the construction of huge convict or arrestee DNA databases
could exacerbate racial divisions. LEE & TIRNADY, supra note 1, at 175; see also Michael E.
Smith, David H. Kaye, & Edward J. Imwinkelried, DNA Data from Everyone Would
Combat Crime, Racism, USA TODAY, July 26, 2001, at i5A.
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based genetic research.1° 2 The deCODE database project has raised
important concerns about ethical protection, the principle of informed
consent,10 3 and the power to regulate genetic information. °4
Considered as a whole, foreign DNA databanking practices offer
contrasts that highlight the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. policies.
Perhaps the main difference between the application of DNA
databanking in the United States and Europe is that European nations
generally permit 'sweeps'- the collection of large numbers (sometimes
thousands) of "elimination samples" to help focus investigations.105
The United Kingdom ° 6 recently caught the attention of critics at home
and abroad when a senior judge suggested that every man, woman,
and child in the country-and those who come to visit-should have
their DNA taken and held on a national police database.107
In sum, in a short time, the United States has witnessed rapid-fire
proposals to expand the size and function of DNA databases, including
calls for a population-wide repository. A universal standard for
sample collection remains highly controversial and will not come to
102 George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE
TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 141 (David Lazer ed., The MIT Press 2004).
103 Since the project's inception, 20,000 people have opted out of deCode, saying their DNA
is being exploited. Gisli Palsson & Paul Rabinow, Iceland: The Case of a National Human
Genome Project, ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, Oct. 1999, at 14-15.
104 DeCode has been the focus of controversy since its inception. Legally a United States
corporation, deCode operates entirely in Iceland and strengthened its financial position
through a business arrangement with pharmaceutical giant Hoffmann La Roche. While
proponents of the database argue that the project was democratically approved by the
Icelandic Parliament and will lead to scientific advances and economic opportunities for
the Icelandic community, privacy opponents characterize the fact that a private company
proposes to construct a genomic map of the Icelandic people (as part of a State-owned and
operated database) and to commercialize information contained in it constitutes "selling
Icelandic DNA." Id. at 14-15.
105 See Reilly, supra note 16, at 313.
106 The United Kingdom currently has the largest DNA database of any country (four
million samples with nearly a quarter of those from children). Five percent of the
population is already in the national database and 30,000 additional samples are being
added every month. Larry Miller, The U.K.'s 'Big Brother' DNA Database, CBSNEws.COM,
Sept. 8, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/o9/07/london/main3242563.shtml.
107 Lord Justice Sir Stephen Sedley is a liberal judge who is angered that minorities
disproportionately have their DNA taken. Forty percent on the database are black. The
Lord Justice argues this is an "indefensible" method of ethnic profiling. Id.
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fruition without an in-depth analysis of the constitutional
repercussions of collecting DNA samples from all citizens.108 The
debate over the appropriate scope of inclusion in a national DNA
database system continues to require additional discussion. For the
time being, the immediate policy discussions might focus on a
consistent and more uniform approach by individual states.10 9
2. CURRENT STATE-SPECIFIC STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS FOR SAMPLE
COLLECTION
Every state has a convicted offender DNA database, but each state
varies according to which offenses trigger databasing upon
conviction.110 Convicted offender databases rest on the premise (for
which there is quite a bit of evidence) that violent criminals tend to re-
offend. "' Every state permits DNA databanking of samples from
adults convicted of serious sexual and other violent offenses.112 As of
approximately July 2005, forty-three states had "all felony"
provisions, and thirty-eight states included some qualifying
misdemeanors. 113 Twenty-eight states permit DNA samples from
juveniles adjudicated "delinquent," to be banked.114 As a general
principle, DNA collection on arrest (collection from "arrestees")
remains the least used method, and only four states authorize it for
108 See Land, supra note 14, at 116-17; Paul E. Tracy & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and
His Science Kit: DNA Databases for 2 1 st Century Crime Control?, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 635, 636-37 (2000) ("[J]ust because it may serve some law enforcement
purpose does not mean the Constitution falls by the wayside.").
1o9 Land, supra note 14, at 117.
11o For specific provisions, see Axelrad, supra note 50; R.E. Gaensslen, Should Biological
Evidence or DNA be Retained by Forensic Science Laboratories After Profiling? No,
Except Under Narrow Legislatively-Stipulated Conditions, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 375,
377 (2006).
111 Gaensslen, supra note 11o, at 377. For philosophical justifications regarding the
collection of samples from recidivists, see Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law
Enforcement's Greatest Surveillance Tool? 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 784 (1999);
Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 2, at 155; Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 58, at 128.
112 Robert Berlet, A Step Too Far: Due Process and DNA Collection in California After
Proposition 69, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1481, 1487 (2007).
113 Gaensslen, supra note 11o, at 377.
114 Id.
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some or all felony offenses: Louisiana, Virginia, Texas, and
California.115
The State of California, in particular, offers a collection model that
radically diverges from traditional DNA database programs. On
November 2, 2004, California voters approved Proposition 69 (The
DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime, and Innocence Protection Act), 116
which allows for sampling of DNA on arrest rather than on conviction.
Additionally, the Proposition vests greater discretion in the judge and
limits appeals of the sample collection in a way that hinders requests
for expungement of DNA information."7 Currently, this law is the
most inclusive and costly state criminal DNA database in the country,
and the state's large geographic area and population render this
expansion in database size and function particularly significant. With
thirty-four million people residing in California (13% of the entire U.S.
population), California's laws carry a unique propensity to establish
national legal precedents. 118 According to the estimates of legal
commentators, well over 600,000 people (including more than
50,000 juveniles) will qualify for testing under Proposition 69 in the
first year of enactment." 9 This figure represents more than ten times
the number of samples the California Department of Justice has ever
processed in a given year.120
15 Berlet, supra note 112, at 1487; see Axelrad, supra note 50. Of the four states for which
arrestee DNA is databanked, only two, Louisiana and California, refuse to overturn a
conviction based on DNA obtained by mistake. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609
(2004) (preventing invalidation of "detention, arrest, or conviction" based on database
information obtained or placed in database by mistake), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 297
(West 2004) (preventing invalidation of "detention ... or conviction" based on database
information obtained, placed, or retained by mistake).
ui6 Simoncelli & Steinhardt, supra note 31, at 279; see also Walsh, supra note 22, at 4.
117 Simoncelli & Steinhardt, supra note 31, at 289. Proposition 69 grants the judge
complete discretion in deciding to grant an expungement request. The statute does not
require a judge to expunge the DNA samples even if the petitioner meets all the
requirements for DNA removal. A person cannot appeal the denial of a removal request,
nor can he challenge it by a petition of writ. Berlet, supra note 112, at 1496.
118 California's air quality standards and tax reduction laws have been widely copied
throughout the United States. See, e.g., Simoncelli & Steinhardt, supra note 31, at 280.
119 Id. at 281.
120 Id.
2008]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
In California, at least, this Proposition voices the preference of the
public for an investment of public resources 121 to expand efforts to
identify potential suspects, regardless of whether it includes people on
the "suspect" list who have never been charged or convicted.122 So far,
no court in California has considered the constitutional implications
of Proposition 69, but the dramatic changes wrought by the law raise
privacy concerns under the Fourth Amendment.123 Legally speaking,
it remains to be seen whether sampling of DNA on arrest is
fundamentally different from sampling after a conviction,124 but thus
far, federal and state courts have repeatedly upheld state efforts to
expand mandatory DNA sampling.
III. APPLYING FOURTH AMENDMENT SCRUTINY To DNA
DATABANKING CHALLENGES
The most recent wave of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
epitomizes permissive governmental searches and reflects the
significant weight courts are willing to afford to crime-solving needs.
Ultimately, the rationale for permitting DNA sampling of criminals
differs based on jurisdiction, but there have been no successful Fourth
Amendment challenges at the appellate court level to DNA
fingerprinting. Thus far, regardless of the test or rationale applied,
challenges to state and federal DNA indexing statutes have been
unsuccessful.125
12, To pay for the new system, California increased costs of all death certificates by two
dollars. Additionally, the state now requires police to ask for and collect DNA information
if relatives volunteer it, and coroners also must collect DNA samples from unidentified
corpses. Lewis Kamb, Lack of a DNA Database Hampers the Police, SEATTLE POsT-
INTELLIGENCE REP., Feb. 27, 2003,
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/11O246_missingdna27.shtml.
122 See Simoncelli & Wallace, supra note 51, at 28.
123 Berlet, supra note 112, at 1498-99.
24 See id. at 1509.
125 Bryant J. Isom, Case Comment, Determining the Proper Test for Analyzing Statutes
Allowing the Taking of DNA Samples from Felons in Nicholas v. Goord: Special Needs
Test or General Balancing Test? 3o AM. J. TRIAL. ADVOC. 383, 395 (2006) (citing Nicholas
v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 658-59 (2d. Cir. 2005)).
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A. LEGAL RATIONALES IN CONTEXT
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches
and seizures.126 Thus, in the context of mandates that specified felons
and arrestees provide the state with samples of their DNA to be kept
on file in a state database, courts are asked to evaluate the degree of
intrusion this has on an individual's privacy, and how much the search
promotes legitimate government interests. 127 Statutes authorizing
DNA database expansion have consistently been met with Fourth
Amendment challenges addressing the constitutionality of the lack of
consistent privacy protections for criminal databases and their
samples. Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly conducted its
own balancing of privacy invasions against law enforcement needs in
the context of DNA databases, courts have consistently justified a
growing list of circumstances for DNA testing through an increasingly
expansive judicial rationale.128 In short, despite emphatic dissents,
every court of appeals that has considered the DNA Analysis Backlog
Elimination Act of 2000 ("DNA Act"), 129 and the subsequent
implementation of state statutes has upheld the statute in question,30
and has concluded that extraction and retention of DNA samples does
not violate the Fourth Amendment.131
Under the Fourth Amendment, to determine whether a particular
governmental intrusion constitutes a search, a court must ask whether
the target of the intrusion has a subjective expectation of privacy in
the information obtained by the government and whether "society is
prepared to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable."132 Any
126 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 2.
127 Matejik, supra note loo, at 70.
128 Recent Cases, 118 HARv. L. REV. 818, 818 (2004).
129 42 U.S.C. §§ 14135-14135e. This Act allows the FBI to collect DNA from all individuals
who are convicted of any of a broad list of federal crimes and sentenced to prison, parole,
probation, or supervised release.
130 Monteleoni, supra note 87, at 248.
131 See Noah Ehrenpreis, Case Comment, Constitutional Law-Diminished Expectations of
Privacy and the Human Genome: Circuits Align on Mandatory DNA Profiling of
Convicted Felons-United States v. Weikert, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 337(2008) (citing
United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007)).
132 Maclin, supra note 13, at 168 (quoting California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988)).
20o8]
844 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 4:3
physical intrusion to the body, such as using a needle to withdraw
blood, constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. 133
Because DNA has the potential to reveal a host of private facts about
an arrestee or convicted felon, courts have found that forcibly taking
and testing DNA is a search.134
In determining the constitutionality of a governmental search, the
focus of the inquiry has always been the reasonableness of the search
in light of all circumstances surrounding the search in question.135
The Supreme Court has described reasonableness as the "central
requirement" of the Fourth Amendment.136 All circuit courts have
upheld the reasonableness of the DNA Act or its state analogues;
however, the circuit courts differ in their method of analysis in DNA
cases. 137
In Samson v. California, the Supreme Court recently provided
further guidance as to the legal standard that should govern search
and seizure jurisprudence in the context of warrantless and suspicion-
less searches.138 The Samson Court announced a "totality of the
circumstances" analysis that would be directly in line with the
precedent followed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Eleventh,
133 See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); see also Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (extending this principle to include the
taking of breath samples because a breathalyzer test was held analogous to the blood-
alcohol test in Schmerber).
134 E.g., Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1559-6o (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a state may
"interfere with" Fourth Amendment rights to obtain DNA without a warrant or probable
cause); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (upholding
compulsory DNA testing of certain conditionally-released federal offenders in the absence
of individualized suspicion that the offenders have committed additional offenses);
Maryland v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19 (Md. 2004) (upholding state DNA collection statute for
certain convicted offenders).
135 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (upholding search based on police officer's
reasonable suspicion of petitioner); see Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002).
136 Matejik, supra note loo, at 70 (citing Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001)).
137 Weikert, 504 F.3d at 8-9 (highlighting other circuits' binding case law).
138 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857-58 (2006). The Court reiterated that
reasonableness, not individualized suspicion, is the focus of the constitutional inquiry. The
Court considered a parolee's diminished expectation of privacy and the state's substantial
interests in reducing recidivism and promoting reintegration of parolees and concluded
that requiring suspicion for a search inhibits the state's ability to effectively supervise
parolees and protect the public from re-offenders.
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and D.C. Circuits in analyzing the DNA Act.139 Because Samson was
not directly addressing a DNA case, however, the Second, Seventh,
and Tenth Circuits have applied a "special needs" analysis, and the
Sixth Circuit has declared either method sufficient to uphold the
constitutionality of the DNA Act.140
1. THE SPECIAL NEEDS TEST
The term "special needs" entered the legal lexicon in Justice
Blackmun's 1985 concurrence in New Jersey v. T.L.O., upholding a
warrantless search of a high school student when school officials had a
reasonable suspicion that the student possessed contraband. 141
Justice Blackmun advocated for a more stringent version of the
traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test: "only in those
exceptional circumstances in which 'special needs,' beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable
cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its
balancing of interests for that of the Framers."142 Nonetheless, far
from maturing into a coherent doctrine, subsequent rulings have
produced a tradition of ad hoc reasoning that makes it difficult to
draw the line between "law enforcement" and "special needs."143
139 Weikert, 504 F.3d at 18 (considering the DNA Act's constitutionality de novo); United
States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3rd Cir. 2005) (analyzing federal DNA Act); Jones
v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 3o6-307 (4th Cir. 1992) (analyzing state DNA statute);
Groceman v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2004) (analyzing federal
DNA Act); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006) (analyzing federal
DNA Act); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 832 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (analyzing
federal DNA Act); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 128o (llth Cir. 2005) (analyzing state
DNA statute); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489,496 (D.C. Cir. 2o06) (analyzing federal
DNA Act).
140 United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2007) (analyzing federal DNA Act);
United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 20o6) (analyzing federal DNA Act);
United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (loth Cir. 2003) (analyzing federal DNA Act);
United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 679-81 (6th Cir. 2006) (analyzing federal DNA Act).
141 Isom, supra note 125, at 386 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring)).
142 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
143 Maclin, supra note 13, at 17o; see, e.g., S.A. SALTZBURG & D.J. CAPRA, AMERICAN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 431 (7th ed. 2004) (after discussing many
special needs cases, asking "[w]here is the line, then, between crime enforcement and
special needs"). David H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, lo
CORNELL J. L. & POL'Y 455, 491 (2001) (noting that lower court judges "have disagreed as to
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Despite purported inconsistencies, the application of the special
needs test gained widespread acceptance in many contexts as a means
to authorize government searches despite the absence of
individualized suspicion.144 Applying this test to instances of DNA
collection and beyond, the Supreme Court affirmed a special needs
exception to the traditionally "closely guarded"145 Fourth Amendment
protections, but only "[i]n limited circumstances where the privacy
interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be
placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion.",46
2. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
An alternative legal theory-which departs from special needs
altogether-has been prominent in the most recent Fourth
Amendment DNA database decisions: the "totality of the
circumstances" analysis. Under DNA statutes, courts "evaluat[e] the
totality of the circumstances" by "balanc[ing] the degree to which
DNA profiling interferes with the privacy interests of qualified federal
offenders against the significance of the public interests served by
such profiling."147 This general balancing approach is a less rigorous
examination under the Fourth Amendment because it does not
require that a special need be identified and it solely considers the
reasonableness of governmental action in relation to the intrusion
against private interests.x48
In most criminal cases, courts strike a balance in favor of
satisfying the reasonability requirement. In an early DNA database
decision, the Ninth Circuit justified an even broader interpretation of
the applicability of the "special needs" exception to convicted-offender DNA databanking)
(listing cases).
144 See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624; Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 660 ("The evolution of the
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that the [special needs] doctrine has
increasingly become the test employed by the Court in suspicionless search cases.").
145 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
146 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
147 Isom, supra note 125, at 386 (citing Kincade, 379 F.3d at 836).
148 Id. (citing Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 664 n.22); but cf. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 184
(concluding that the totality of the circumstances test is "more rigorous" than the special
needs doctrine).
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"reasonableness," holding that drawing blood for DNA analysis was
analogous to taking a fingerprint (a minimal intrusion).149 Under this
theory, constitutionality would be determined by balancing the degree
to which the database would advance the public interest against the
severity of the resulting interference with individual liberty. 150
Relying on the initial Rise v. Oregon decision, an eleven-judge panel
in the Ninth Circuit recently announced a holding in Kincade that
noticeably broadens the population subjected to DNA testing. 151
Furthermore, Kincade increases the circumstances in which DNA
testing may be used, and in the case of a federal parolee, the Kincade
Court concluded that despite the alarmist tone of outraged
opponents, 152 the interests furthered by the federal DNA Act are
undeniably compelling:
In light of conditional releasees' substantially
diminished expectations of privacy, the minimal
intrusion occasion by blood sampling, and the
overwhelming societal interests so clearly furthered by
the collection of DNA information from convicted
offenders, we must conclude that compulsory DNA
profiling of qualified federal offenders is reasonable
under the totality of the circumstances.153
Although the split among appellate courts is over methodology,
not ultimate conclusions, it is the totality of the circumstances
analysis that seems to be emerging as the controlling precedent in
evaluating suspicionless searches under DNA indexing statutes. This
149 Commentators have commonly drawn an analogy between DNA and fingerprints;
genetic analysis is often described as "DNA fingerprinting." Joh, supra note 26, at 869.
150 Rise, 59 F.3d at 1562.
151 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 831, 837, 839.
152 Id. at 838 ("In our system of government, courts base decisions not on dramatic
Hollywood fantasies, but on concretely particularized facts developed in the cauldron of the
adversary process and reduced to an assessable record. If, as Kincade's aligned amici and
Judge Reinhardt's dissent insist, and when, some future program permits the parade of
horribles the DNA Act's opponents fear-unregulated disclosure of CODIS profiles to private
parties, genetic discrimination, state-sponsored eugenics, and (whatever it means) the use
of CODIS to somehow 'quite literally, to eliminate political opposition,' we have every
confidence that courts will respond appropriately.").
153 Id. at 839.
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trend finds its strongest support in the recent United States v. Weikert
holding, 154 in which the First Circuit relied heavily upon the additional
guidance provided by the Supreme Court in California v. Samson55 to
conclude that governmental interests outweigh a parolee's privacy
expectation.'5 6 Citing the permissive governmental searches affirmed
in Samson, critics of the majority opinion in Weikert suggest that
recent decisions manifest a growing judicial proclivity to apply less-
exacting standards.157 It has been suggested that increased deference
for crime-solving agendas signal an erosion of Fourth Amendment
principles.5 8
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE GOING FORWARD
On first (and perhaps even second) glance, the distinction between
the two rationales may seem meaningless because they reach
essentially the same result. However, the test applied by the courts
will make a great deal of difference as there will undoubtedly be future
pressure to expand DNA databases to include DNA profiles of
individuals who wish to obtain drivers licenses or federal passports;
applicants for federal jobs or admission to public universities; all
newborns or potentially the entire population.,59 Without an explicit
indication of the preferred doctrinal rationale to be applied, it makes
ensuing discussion of such hypothetical databases unnecessarily
154 Weikert, 504 F.3d at 8-11 (determining "special needs" test inapplicable).
155 The Samson Court upheld a parole scheme allowing random searches of parolees at any
time without individualized suspicion because the government has a "substantial" interest
in monitoring, rehabilitating, and preventing recidivism of parolees. Samson, 547 U.S.
843.
i6 Weikert, 504 F.3d at 14 (determining forced DNA extraction reasonable for supervised
releases during the defendant's term).
157 Robert Cacace, Samson v. California: Tearing Down a Pillar of Fourth Amendment
Protections, 42 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223, 237 (2007) (noting "[a]s the DNA cases make
clear, courts are eager to extend Samson's logic along the continuum toward law-abiding
citizens").
i8 Weikert, 504 F.3d at 18-20 (Stahl, J., dissenting) (warning that the substantial weight
afforded to general crime-solving needs, coupled with the negligible weight afforded to
individual privacy interests, signals cause for concern that "ordinary citizens who, because
of their employment, activity, or position in society" may be subjected to unwarranted and
suspicionless searches); see also Cacace, supra note 157.
159 See Recent Cases, supra note 128, at 821-23.
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complicated and politically perilous. It is difficult to predict how these
questions ultimately will be resolved, but it seems sensible for the
Supreme Court to clarify its position amidst the rapid growth of
genetic technologies that make expanded uses of DNA profiles a likely
forthcoming legislative proposal.
IV. CONCLUSION
Without a doubt, bio-politics in the twenty-first century has
generated hopes and fears, expectation and trepidation, celebration
and condemnation. If public policy must balance a range of
increasingly intrusive options to individual rights against the benefits
of law enforcement, then it is incumbent upon the expanding police
powers to demonstrate benefits to the public good. Experience tells us
that DNA identification databases can be structured to respect most
individual privacy interests and can be administered fairly, but
uniform federal regulations would undoubtedly allay fears of database
misuse by third parties and government abuse of such data. An even
more modest, but still desirable, regulatory improvement would be to
explicitly mandate that all states ensure adequate privacy protections
for their respective legislative schemes. New expansions of DNA
technology should be adopted only if they would be consistent with
fundamental privacy and civil liberty interests. Furthermore, if the
crime-solving and prevention benefits of DNA databases warrant
greater establishment, continuation, and funding, policy justifications
should be provided in the legislatures and in the courts to maintain a
critical and consistent balance.
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